

Demographic Dynamics in Israel as a Potential Determinant in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution

By

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Abstract

The article examines how Israel's demographic dynamics, particularly the growing Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) population, could influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's resolution. Israel's current power advantage in the conflict stems from its military, technological, and economic strengths, along with U.S. support. However, internal demographic changes could shift this balance. Israel's population is young and diverse, with Jews making up around 78% and Arabs about 21%. Within the Jewish community, the Haredi demographic is growing rapidly due to high birth rates, and it is projected to make up a third of the population by 2065. The Haredi community's distinct social, religious, and economic practices create challenges for integration, as they often abstain from secular education, workforce participation, and military service. These trends could strain Israel's economy and military, creating an unbearable financial and security burden. Additionally, rising sectarianism and shifts in U.S. public opinion may further complicate Israel's internal stability and international relations. Consequently, Israel may eventually need to seek peace or compromise to maintain domestic and regional stability.

Introduction

The Arab-Israeli conflict has endured for over seventy years, presenting intricate and persistent obstacles to achieving a peaceful resolution. Israel, at present, maintains a strong and dominant stance within the conflict due to its developed economy, highly advanced technological and military capabilities, extensive intelligence reach, and steadfast support from the United States.

Leveraging these strategic advantages, Israel has secured a series of significant victories in major regional conflicts over the past several decades,

assumed legislative control over Jerusalem as its unified capital, and occupied key territories such as the West Bank. This favourable position could suggest that Israel may have minimal motivation to engage in substantial compromises with Palestinian-Arab factions. However, certain demographic trends within Israel may act as influencing factors, potentially impelling the state toward considering new avenues for resolution.

General Overview of Israeli Demographic Situation

Israel's demographic composition is notably heterogeneous. As of the most recent estimates, the population of Israel already exceeded 10 million people¹, with an annual growth of around 1.2%. Within this population, approximately 78.6% identify as various Jewish groups, while slightly over 21% identify as diverse Arab groups, encompassing Muslims, Christians, and others². The remaining percentage comprises smaller ethnic groups, including Arameans, Copts, Armenians, Samaritans, Circassians, etc.

Israel's population continues to experience sustained growth, which has positioned it among the youngest populations in the developed world. For instance, as of 2022 children aged 0-14 represent 28.07% of Israel's population³, contrasting with the European Union, where this age group accounted for 14.69% in 2023 (down from 15.4% in 2011)⁴. Projections indicate that Israel's population will reach 10 million by 2024, expand to 15 million by 2048, and approach 20 million by 2065⁵. Forecasts also suggest a relatively stable demographic composition, with the proportion of Jewish and Arab residents remaining around 75% and 20-21%, respectively⁶.

The Arab demographic segment within Israel presents notable socio-political complexities. It is important to clarify that this segment does not refer to Palestinian

¹ Population of Israel. Central Bureau of Statistics :— URL: <https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/Statistics/Pages/%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%9C-%D7%A1%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA.aspx?r=ea3bd53b-b8ef-4c4a-8f6f-8eb5e8cdb84f&uptodate=1>

² Vital Statistics: Latest Population Statistics for Israel. Jewish Virtual Library :— URL: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/latest-population-statistics-for-israel>

³ Israel: Age structure from 2012 to 2022. Statista :— URL: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/526596/age-structure-in-israel/>

⁴ European Union: Age distribution of inhabitants from 2013 to 2023. Statista :— URL: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/253408/age-distribution-in-the-european-union-eu/>

⁵ Projections of Israel Population until 2065. Central bureau of Statistics :— URL: https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2017/138/01_17_138e.pdf

⁶ Ibid.

residents of the West Bank or Gaza, but rather to Arab citizens of Israel holding Israeli passports. While the State of Israel has implemented initiatives aimed at integrating this segment into Israeli society, there are policies and practices that many view as contradictory to this aim. For example, Amnesty International has issued reports characterizing Israel as a state that enforces an apartheid-like approach toward its Arab citizens⁷. Echoing this perspective, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that "Israel is not a country for all its citizens, but only for Jewish citizens."⁸

A further critical issue within Israel's demographic landscape is the perception of a lack of unity among Jewish population. Contrary to the common perception of homogeneity, the Jewish demographic in Israel is diverse and internally divided. According to a survey conducted by the Pnima public policy research organization⁹, 40% of native Israelis report negative sentiments toward Arabs, while 33% express similar sentiments toward immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Additionally, 30% express unfavourable attitudes toward Sephardic Jews (often referred to as "Eastern" Jews), 26% toward Ashkenazi Jews ("European" Jews), 20% toward ultra-Orthodox Jews, 17% toward Jewish settlers in the West Bank, 13% toward members of the LGBTQ+ community, and 11% toward Ethiopian Jews. Beyond these inter-group tensions, 51% of respondents expressed negative views toward Knesset members, 34% toward journalists and judges, 20% toward mayors, and 17% toward police officers. Moreover, 64% of respondents believe that notable tension persists between the two largest Jewish sub-groups, Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews.

Among these groups, Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews (Haredi) stand out for their distinct cultural and religious identity. Represented in popular perception by traditional attire, Haredim are viewed unfavourably by approximately 20% of the Israeli population, according to the Pnima survey. This particular demographic, known for its adherence to ultra-Orthodox practices, could be a driving force for significant societal shifts within Israel. Should the Israeli government fail to implement strategies that effectively address the distinct needs and challenges associated with the Haredi community, substantial changes in the socio-political landscape may arise in the future.

⁷ Israel's apartheid against Palestinians: Cruel system of domination and crime against humanity. Amnesty International : [сайт]. — URL: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/5141/2022/en/>

⁸ Netanyahu Says Israel Is 'Nation-State Of The Jewish People And Them Alone'. NPR: — URL: <https://www.npr.org/2019/03/11/702264118/netanyahu-says-israel-is-nation-state-of-the-jewish-people-and-them-alone>

⁹ Who we are? Pnima Israel— URL: <https://www.pnimaIsrael.com/english>

Overview of the Haredi Demographic Group

As of 2023, Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jews constitute approximately 14% of Israel's total population, though precise estimates of this population remain somewhat uncertain due to reporting challenges and unique lifestyle characteristics¹⁰. The Haredi community is the fastest-growing demographic segment within Israel, distinguished by markedly high birth rates. According to existing data, between 2020 and 2022, the average fertility rate among Haredi women reached 6.4¹¹ children per woman, contrasting sharply with 2.5 among other Jewish women. In comparison, the fertility rate within Israel's Muslim population has declined to just under 3 children per woman (2.99)¹². The rapid population increase within the Haredi community is projected to continue¹³, with current models suggesting that Haredim will comprise roughly 20% of the Israeli population by 2040, and up to 32% by 2065¹⁴.

The Haredim are a distinct group within the broader Jewish population, adhering to strict interpretations of ultra-Orthodox Judaism. Central to Haredi doctrine is the belief that Jewish return to the Holy Land and the establishment of a Jewish state remain forbidden under divine law until the arrival of the Messiah. This conviction, rooted in the theological concept of "galut" (exile)¹⁵, asserts that the Jewish diaspora is divinely mandated as punishment for violations of the Covenant, persisting from the destruction of the Second Temple in the 1st century AD. According to this interpretation, any restoration of Jewish statehood, such as the establishment of the modern State of Israel, is regarded as a human transgression against divine will. Furthermore, the present secular nature of Israel, despite the influence of Judaism on aspects of its legal and social systems, is fundamentally at

¹⁰ Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel. The Israeli Democracy Institute : — URL: <https://en.idi.org.il/haredi/2023/>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² The Moslem Population in Israel. Central Bureau of Statistics : URL: https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2022/217/11_22_217e.pdf

¹³ Haredi population growing twice as fast as overall Israeli population — report. —The Times of Israel :.— URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/haredi-population-growing-twice-as-fast-as-total-israeli-population-report/>

Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel. The Israeli Democracy Institute : — URL: <https://en.idi.org.il/haredi/2023/>

¹⁴ Projections of Israel Population until 2065. —Central bureau of Statistics— URL: https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2017/138/01_17_138e.pdf

¹⁵ Галут. —Электронная Еврейская Энциклопедия :— URL: <https://eleven.co.il/jewish-history/overview/11035/>

Eng: Galut – Electronic Jewish Encyclopaedia :— URL: <https://eleven.co.il/jewish-history/overview/11035/>

odds with ultra-Orthodox principles, as the State does not adhere entirely to Torah and Halakha (Jewish law).

Notably, certain Haredi groups, such as Neturei Karta and the Satmar Hasidim, actively oppose the statehood of Israel itself, maintaining highly publicized stances against its legitimacy. These factions are visible in international media, with members frequently appearing in public protests carrying Palestinian flags and displaying slogans supporting Palestinian liberation. While some Haredi factions, like Agudat Israel, align themselves with Zionist objectives, the majority adopt a stance of neutrality. These neutral groups reside within the political boundaries of Israel but strive for minimal engagement with secular society and governmental structures, often residing in exclusively Haredi-populated cities and neighbourhoods to maintain cultural and religious separateness. Notable examples include Modiin-Ilit, Bnei Brak, and particular neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, where Haredi concentrate to reduce interaction with secular society.

The Haredi community largely refrains from utilizing public services, opting instead for religious schools rather than state-run institutions. Members of this community generally do not serve in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), from which they are traditionally exempt. They similarly avoid official government functions, do not partake in secular national holidays such as Independence Day. Haredi resistance to integration is also evident in matters of public health; for instance, ultra-Orthodox groups were among the most prominent opponents of vaccination campaigns within Israel. In effect, the Haredi demographic has established autonomous enclaves within Israel's broader sociopolitical landscape, presenting both a unique cultural identity and a distinct set of challenges for state integration policies.

Why Is This a Problem for the State of Israel?

The socioeconomic structure of the Haredi community presents significant challenges to Israel's broader economic landscape. The majority of adult Haredi men are primarily devoted to the study of Judaism in yeshivas, which restricts their participation in the workforce and limits their contributions to economic productivity. This lifestyle choice reflects ideological priorities within the community; prominent Haredi political figures, such as Yitzhak Goldknopf, have publicly questioned the relevance of secular subjects like mathematics and English in Israel's public education system, expressing doubt about their necessity for economic

success¹⁶. Among Haredi men, approximately 55%¹⁷ participate in the labour market, yet those who are employed often occupy lower-wage, part-time positions¹⁸. Consequently, the average income within the Haredi community is substantially lower than that of the general Israeli population, with average earnings nearly half those of non-Haredi citizens¹⁹.

Economic support for many Haredi households is derived primarily from government subsidies, which include child allowances, unemployment benefits, and funding for yeshiva education. Additional financial support frequently comes from the earnings of Haredi women. Due to this economic structure, the poverty rate among Haredi is significantly higher than the national average, with 44% of Haredi households living below the poverty line, compared to 22% nationwide. On average, a non-Orthodox household contributes approximately 4,500 shekels in taxes per month, whereas a Haredi household contributes only around 1,500 shekels²⁰, while receiving substantial child benefits; for instance, a family with six children receives a monthly allowance of 1,059 shekels, exclusive of other state support²¹.

If current trends persist, projections indicate that by the mid-21st century, over half of Israel's population may consist of Haredi and Arab citizens—demographic groups often characterized by either anti-Zionist sentiments or neutral attitudes toward the state. This demographic shift may significantly impact Israel's economy, as both groups show limited integration into the formal labour market. As a result, the economic burden on the state is expected to intensify, as a growing segment of the population will likely remain economically dependent, creating a financial strain on the government. These challenges are especially concerning in light of on-going security expenditures related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which sometimes reach up to 13% of Israel's GDP and can escalate to as high as 30%

¹⁶ Haredi political leader: English, math studies useless for Israel's economy. —The Jerusalem Post— URL: <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-719751>

¹⁷ Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel. The Israeli Democracy Institute : — URL: <https://en.idi.org.il/haredi/2023/>

¹⁸ Israel is facing a ticking bomb: Haredi unemployment / Katz Yaakov. The Jerusalem Post :— URL: <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-722709>

¹⁹ Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel. The Israel Democracy Institute — URL: <https://en.idi.org.il/haredi/2021/?chapter=38442><https://en.idi.org.il/haredi/2021/?chapter=38442>

²⁰ Israel is facing a ticking bomb: Haredi unemployment / Katz Yaakov. // The Jerusalem Post URL: <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-722709>

²¹ Benefit amount. National Insurance — URL: https://www.btl.gov.il/RussianHomePage/Benefits_ru/Yeladim_ru/Pages/shiureHakitzba_ru.aspx

Calculator for determining the amount of social benefits. National Insurance; URL: <https://www.btl.gov.il/benefits/children/Pages/Calculator.aspx>

during full-scale conflicts²² or in anticipation of potential confrontations with Iran. The prospect of a substantial demographic shift toward groups with limited economic integration and potentially weaker loyalty to the state introduces significant concerns regarding Israel's future economic stability and national security.

The political influence of the Haredi community adds further complexity to this issue. Despite constituting only 14% of the population, the Haredi bloc wields considerable political power, as evidenced in recent Knesset elections. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, has recently engaged in coalition discussions with influential religious leaders such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who now hold key ministerial positions in finance and national security. These figures have espoused views that are, at times, regarded as highly controversial, with some of their ideological positions drawing comparisons to extreme nationalism, raising potential concerns about escalating tensions with both the Arab population and secular Jewish communities. Given this context, questions arise regarding the potential influence the Haredi community might exert should their demographic representation rise to one-third of Israel's population in the coming decades.

The socioeconomic and political complexities surrounding the Haredi community are widely acknowledged within Israel²³ and internationally²⁴, highlighting a multifaceted challenge that encompasses economic, social, and national security dimensions.

The Haredi Population as a Potential Factor in Israeli-Palestinian Peace Dynamics

The current trajectory of Israel's demographic and social policies presents complex risks to the state's economic and socio-political stability. If these trends persist, a substantial proportion of Israel's population may consist of groups whose allegiance to the state is relatively moderate or neutral, while simultaneously

²² Сколько стоят Израилю войны и может ли конфликт с палестинцами разорить его?. // Русская служба BBC— URL: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-57296633>
ENG: How much do the wars cost to Israel and can the conflict with Palestinians break it? BBC: Russian Service

²³ UTJ leader proves that haredim will destroy Israel - opinion / Friedman Shuki. —the Jerusalem Post— URL: <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-720483>

²⁴ The real threat to modern Israel / Perry Dan. Atlantic Council— URL: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-real-threat-to-modern-israel/>
Israel's Ultra-Orthodox Problem. Middle East Policy Council— URL: <https://mepc.org/commentary/israels-ultra-orthodox-problem>

drawing more in state benefits than they contribute in economic productivity. This imbalance is likely to increase the state's financial burden, as a growing dependent population will necessitate expanded government resources to support welfare and social services.

The current demographic trends in Israel pose potential challenges to the state's security infrastructure, particularly impacting its security agencies and defence capabilities. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, a longstanding arrangement between the founding fathers of the State of Israel and the Haredi community, known as *Torato Umanuto* ("Torah study is his job"), has allowed Haredi men who engage in Torah study within specialized institutions (yeshivas) to receive military service deferments. Initially, this policy involved only around 600 exemptions, a number that was manageable and posed little impact on national security at the time. However, with the rapid growth of the Haredi population, the demographic composition has shifted markedly: while in 1974 Haredi men represented just 2.4% of draft-age males, by 2024, this figure has risen to approximately 17%.²⁵

The issue of Haredi enlistment in the IDF has intensified amid ongoing military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon, highlighting concerns over the "inequality of burden" between Haredi and other Jewish communities. A majority of Israelis support mandatory service for the Haredi, viewing it as a means to balance contributions to national defence²⁶. Although a legal exemption previously permitted the Haredi to avoid military service, this exemption expired in June 2023. Despite this, the Israeli government refrained from initiating compulsory conscription for the Haredi population.

On 25th of June 2023, Israel's Supreme Court (Bagatz) declared this non-enforcement of conscription illegal, ruling that in the absence of a legal exemption, the non-draft of Haredi men constitutes a violation of Israeli law²⁷. This ruling provoked significant resistance within the Haredi community, with leaders and

²⁵ Expiration of haredi draft deferments hurtles Israel into brave new world - analysis. Jerusalem Post :— URL: <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-794813>

²⁶ Israel's top court rules ultra-Orthodox Jews must be drafted into military, in blow to Netanyahu. CNN :— URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/06/25/middleeast/israel-orthodox-military-high-court-intl/index.html#:~:text=Although%20the%20Supreme%20Court%20has,gives%20them%20a%20legal%20exemption.&text=The%20ruling%20is%20likely%20to,its%20political%20and%20military%20leaders.>

²⁷ Maayan, Lubell Israel court ends draft exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews. Reuters :— URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-supreme-court-rules-religious-seminary-students-must-be-drafted-military-2024-06-25/>

community members pledging to defy any enlistment orders²⁸. Haredi journalist Yanki Farber noted that the ruling would have little effect on Haredi enlistment, as many within the community remain steadfastly opposed to military service²⁹. Demonstrating this point, although the IDF identified 63,000 Haredi men as eligible for military service³⁰, it issued only approximately 3,000 draft orders to Haredi men following the court decision, with just about 230 men reported to recruitment offices³¹.

The Bagatz decision has also intensified political tensions within the Israeli government and Knesset, as Haredi political leaders have responded to the Bagatz ruling and the IDF's conscription efforts with fierce opposition³². Haredi parties are a crucial component of Prime Minister Netanyahu's coalition; without their cooperation—currently conditional upon securing a legal exemption for military service—the coalition risks collapse³³, potentially leaving Netanyahu vulnerable to significant legal challenges. Consequently, Netanyahu has already reassured Haredi leaders that legislation enshrining this exemption will be enacted³⁴. Current political tensions surrounding Haredi conscription are occurring at a time when Haredi communities constitute approximately 14% of Israel's population and do not hold a dominant share of Knesset seats. It is reasonable to project that, as the proportion of Haredi within the population continues to grow, their political influence will similarly expand. Consequently, issues related to Haredi integration, particularly the military service exemption, are likely to intensify, potentially leading to greater political turbulence and more frequent coalition crises. This projected demographic shift could profoundly impact Israeli politics, as parties navigate the challenges of balancing religious autonomy with national obligations.

²⁸ 'We will not enlist:' Ultra-Orthodox in Israel vow to defy orders to serve in the military. CNN : — URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/01/middleeast/ultra-orthodox-in-israel-defy-orders-to-serve-in-military-mime-intl/index.html>

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ The Haredi Exemption. Israeli Policy Forum : — URL: <https://israelpolicyforum.org/2024/06/25/the-haredi-exemption/>

³¹ IDF to issue 7,000 more draft orders to Haredim after unsuccessful first phase. The Times of Israel : — URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-to-issue-7000-more-draft-orders-to-haredim-after-unsuccessful-first-phase/>

³² Netanyahu promises Haredi draft bill by month's end, as ultra-Orthodox threaten budget. Times of Israel : — URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-promises-haredi-draft-bill-by-months-end-as-ultra-orthodox-threaten-budget/>

³³ Haredi Minister Threatens to Topple Netanyahu's Gov't if Conscription Bill Does Not Pass. Haaretz : — URL: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-10-15/ty-article/.premium/haredi-minister-threatens-to-quit-netanyahu-government-if-conscription-bill-passes/00000192-909b-d2ee-a9f3-9e9fec1d0000>

³⁴ Netanyahu promises Haredi draft bill by month's end, as ultra-Orthodox threaten budget. Times of Israel : — URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-promises-haredi-draft-bill-by-months-end-as-ultra-orthodox-threaten-budget/>

It is noteworthy that several attempts to end the *Torato Umanuto* exemption have been made in the past, specifically in 1998, 2012, and 2017³⁵, yet none have led to a complete abolition of this longstanding principle of the Israeli state. The persistence of this exemption underscores its deeply embedded status within Israeli society, reflecting the enduring complexities of balancing religious traditions with the state's national obligations.

As debates over the exemption law continue in the Knesset and the final decision remains uncertain, a projection based on a worst-case scenario for the Israeli state is worth considering: that the exemption is ultimately preserved. This hypothetical outcome is not without basis; previous attempts to abolish the exemption have repeatedly failed, and the political influence of the Haredi community is set to grow.

Should the current trends related to the integration of Haredi into military persist, the already existing issues with enlistment and manpower³⁶ will definitely worsen in future when Haredi will comprise a significantly larger share of population: by 2065 around 50% of the entire country's population (Haredi and Arabs together) may have exemption from military service in the worst-case scenario. Furthermore, as Israel remains one of the highest per capita military spenders globally³⁷, it is likely that the increasing economic strain resulting from a higher proportion of non-working or under-employed Haredi citizens will impose additional financial pressures. Consequently, maintaining sufficient funding for the IDF, alongside critical security agencies such as Mossad, Shabak, and specialized police units, may become increasingly challenging as defence needs compete with social welfare demands on the national budget.

Additionally, the demographic expansion of the Haredi community is expected to heighten socio-cultural tensions across various segments of Israeli society. Current data underscores these risks: for example, a survey by Prima indicates that 20% of Israeli respondents harbour negative attitudes toward the religious sector, which currently comprises only 14% of the population. It is reasonable to predict that these tensions may intensify in tandem with the growing size of the Haredi population. Furthermore, the political influence of the Orthodox

³⁵ The Haredi Exemption. Israeli Policy Forum :— URL: <https://israelpolicyforum.org/2024/06/25/the-haredi-exemption/>

³⁶ Israeli war chief demands extended mandatory service to overcome troop shortages. The Cradle :— URL: <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/25550>

³⁷ How big is Israel's military and how much funding does it get from the US?. Al-Jazeera : — URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/how-big-is-israels-military-and-how-much-funding-does-it-get-from-the-us>

community is anticipated to expand as their demographic presence increases, likely affording them a decisive voting bloc in national elections. This shift could introduce a form of sectarianism into Israeli politics, with associated risks of economic and political instability, decreased immigration, elevated emigration, and a potential brain drain as highly skilled professionals may seek opportunities abroad.

This evolving internal division risks engendering a climate of widespread intergroup distrust and antagonism. These dynamics may be further complicated by shifting perspectives in the United States, traditionally Israel's strongest ally. Notably, a growing proportion of young Americans (under 29 years old) are reported to express greater sympathy toward Palestine³⁸. This trend, which even further accelerated after the IDF brutal campaigns in Gaza Strip and Lebanon, signals a potential shift in public opinion within the U.S. that may impact future diplomatic and financial support for Israel. Additionally, Israel's long-standing geopolitical adversaries are likely to capitalize on Israel's internal social and economic challenges, potentially intensifying their efforts to undermine the state's stability.

In summary, the demographic rise of the Haredi population, alongside other sociopolitical factors, could act as a significant variable in the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian relations and Israel's long-term security posture. As these internal pressures mount, they may gradually erode Israel's capacity to maintain its current policies without recalibration, impacting both domestic cohesion and international relations. Given the steadily mounting security and economic pressures—exacerbated by the rapid growth of the Haredi population—Israeli authorities may ultimately confront the necessity of making significant concessions to align domestic capacities with broader foreign policy objectives. From an analytical standpoint, a strategic reconciliation and pursuit of peace with neighbouring Arab states would represent a prudent approach to mitigating these escalating burdens and fostering regional stability.

³⁸ Most younger Americans view Israel unfavorably, poll finds. The Axios.— URL: <https://www.axios.com/2022/07/11/young-americans-view-israel-unfavorably-pew-poll>
Pew survey finds younger Americans now favor Palestinians as much as Israelis. The Times of Israel. URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/pew-survey-finds-younger-americans-now-favor-palestinians-as-much-as-israelis/>

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